Getting serious with Gaza
Instead of going right back to two trucks a day, and in spite of Hamas's blatant disregard of its own commitment, 200 trucks a day continue to enter the war zone, replenishing Hamas with all it needs to keep fighting, and to refuse any hostage deal put on the table.
Editorial note: The Reserve Officers Forum has kindly provided me with an English translation of their recently-released The General's Plan. Murtadd to Human publishes it here with the RFO's permission, with minor editorial adjustments for clarity.
Introduction
From the first week of the war until now, the Israeli strategy has been based on the claim that only military pressure brings desired results. Today, eleven months and more since October 7, 2023, we can say with confidence - this strategy is a failure.
It failed, in part, because although the IDF has many tactical achievements, it was unable to attain its strategic goals: total containment of the fighting areas, complete "drainage" of non-combatant population from combat zones, creation of an alternative to the distribution of humanitarian aid by Hamas, and more.
The purpose of this document is not to cry a river over what passed, but to suggest decisive additional action, that will invariably propagate a pivotal change enabling the achievement of these goals.
The existing situation
There seems to be a gap between the assessment of the situation in Gaza and the actual reality on the ground, as it is perceived by the Chief Command and the government, which fails to account for the stubborn recovery of Hamas, in every place exited by the IDF.
While the IDF demonstrates fast and steep learning curves while fighting, steadfastly adherent to the mission, constantly improving performance, with an emphasis on underground combat, there is a constant underestimation of Hamas's repeated comeback, quickly replenishing its assault arsenal, re-staffing its ranks, and regaining control over provision distribution, effectively forcing the local population back into its claws. As we write this document, the IDF has yet to come up with a contingency.
Below is a chart that illustrates the assumed damage over time to Hamas by IDF operations (Fig. 1) compared to the real damage, which takes into account Hamas' simultaneous recovery:
Curve 1 illustrates what informs the current MO: continuous military pressure will eventually (date undetermined) crush Hamas. Contrary to curve 1, we believe curve 2 to be more reliably reflecting the truth, and subsequent to its injunction we offer an alternative MO, predicated on the certainty that the current perception shaping the decision-making by Chief Command, will drag the IDF into a Sisyphean, muddy, never-ending battle with no clear conclusion and endless blurring and permutations of the initial goals.
The suggested strategy: A siege
Without getting into the politics of the situation (except encouraging a ruling alternative to the Hamas, which is a pursuit we also gave up, for some reason), we must focus on debilitating at least one of the four pillars upon which Hamas's rule is contingent: funding, recruitment, supply control and ideological motivation, while adhering to international law.
Presently, cutting off supplies is by far the fastest, most cost-effective, safest for non-combatants, readily-available tactic. We've outlined a strategy designed to sever the supply chains and isolate terrorist cells, making it easier for the IDF to deal with their regrouping and safer for local population to move to non-combat zones, beginning with smart utilisation of the Netzarim Corridor.
Attached in addendum.
Implementation of this strategy will allow:
- Leveraging a faster and better hostage deal
- Examination of governing alternatives without the threat of Hamas resurgence, moving closer to a permanent solution.
Learning from past experience, rather than engaging in wishful thinking, nine months ago, in the first hostage deal, Israel received ten live hostages a day, in return for three prisoners of insignificant status. Furthermore, back then the IDF was not required to withdraw from any territory it had taken over. How did it happen then, that precisely when the IDF's pressure was still moderate we got such a good deal, whereas now, when the pressure is off the charts, and half of Hamas' terrorists are dead, we are unable to obtain even a much worse deal?
The answer is simple, the deal in November was reached because up to this point, Israel allowed only two trucks of provisions to enter Gaza daily. Hamas begged, as part of the deal, to increase the amount to 200. The day Israel folded and this number was agreed upon, Hamas immediately ceased fulfilling its end of the bargain, and doubled down on the stringent attitude we see from it till today.
But instead of going right back to two trucks a day, and in spite of Hamas's blatant disregard of its own commitment, 200 trucks a day continue to enter the war zone, replenishing Hamas with all it needs to keep fighting, and to refuse any hostage deal put on the table.
When Abraham Lincoln, with General Ulysses Grant, led the forces of the North to victory over the South in the Civil War, the victory kept the alliance united and led to the complete abolition of slavery. All this was possible thanks to Grant's siege tactics and the economic decline of the South at the hands of the North. The military campaign was the final tactical blow – not the strategy. Their portraits are immortalised on US dollar bills to this day.
In World War II, Winston Churchill understood this with terrifying clarity. In his famous speech ("Blood, Sweat and Tears"), he announced his intention to impose a heavy blockade and starve out any Nazi stronghold, including Italy and France, where he denied civilian populace food, some of whom must have opposed the Nazis. Churchill believed that the introduction of food would serve the Nazis and inevitably prolong the war, ultimately inflicting greater and longer suffering for those under Nazi control.
In conclusion
As long as there is an unlimited supply of food, water and fuel in Gaza, and as long as Hamas is the party distributing this supply, while no effort is made towards physically separating it from civilians, there is literally no incentive for Hamas to reach an agreement. None. Its participation in negotiations is for appearances only, a PR stunt designed to sway public opinion, which it knows will increase global pressure on Israel to end the war.
Under these circumstances every hostage deal will fall through, Hamas's reign will not come to an end and the war will not see a near-term conclusion.
As outlined in the strategy blueprint attached, a siege is the safest, fastest most effective way to flush out Hamas, end its reign of terror, and wipe out Iran's best play on the board.
Picture credits:
Reuters/Mohammed Salem via https://www.jpost.com/israel-hamas-war/article-820030
Gadi Taub, Sinwar’s useful idiots, Jewish News Syndicate, 8 September 2024 https://www.jns.org/sinwars-useful-idiots/