The Annexation of Territory in War: Answer to Dr Meir Finkel, Part 1
Some societies and cultures consider themselves as permanently at war. When not shedding their enemies' blood, they are preparing to shed their enemies' blood. Such cultures understand relations only as domination and submission. To fail to annex their territory in war is to ask for perpetual war.
Brigadier General (res.) Dr Meir Finkel does not understand Israel’s enemy. In an otherwise encouraging essay, “The Occupation of Territory in War: A Diplomatic and Strategic Achievement for Israel,” Dr Finkel expounds an argument well-overdue for open public debate: the much-misunderstood and much-abused concept of occupation, specifically in the context of Israel (a claim that might not hold true for Hebrew material). For this opening up of the occupation discussion, the Brigadier General is to be commended.
Dr Finkel’s essay displays two main weaknesses, and some minor ones. As with all technocratic approaches, the unquantifiable is often ignored, almost always to the detriment of whatever analysis or policy might be based on this approach. This essay is no exception. The essay makes assumptions about Israel’s enemy that are treated as self-evident, axiomatic, too obvious to warrant reflection, let alone testing. This corresponds to the formulaic character of the technocratic approach, as if life is a simple equation.
Dr Finkel acknowledges that up to the 1980s, the occupation of territory was a central components in the IDF's war doctrine, before going on to offer a brief summary of General Aviv Kochavi’s post-Lebanon Victory Concept, to which his essay is a response. Dr Finkel says:
The Victory Concept authored by Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi had three pillars: long-range fire strikes, ground maneuver, and defense. With the ground maneuver emphasizing “neutralizing capabilities” – in other words, maneuvering for the purposes of destroying specific enemy assets: artillery, combatants, and military infrastructure, but not for the purpose of occupying territory. (My emphasis)
Dr Finkel also responds to the ruling ideological aversion to occupation. “It has been argued for many years that occupying territory is not worth the price it will cost in terms of heavy casualties and exposure of IDF troops to guerrilla warfare.” From here Dr Finkel builds a case for a strictly functional approach to occupation, proposing three reasons for why occupation should be viewed dispassionately as a net benefit to Israel. As he sees it, occupation should not be shunned as inherently undesirable, but viewed as there to perform a function and be continued as long as is necessary to achieve Israel’s diplomatic goals. He takes care to point out that his ideas are not intended to harm the enemy population, on the contrary.
I would not presume to intrude on Dr Finkel’s military expertise, being as I am, far from qualified to do so. But I do know Islam and I do know Muslims from having been one myself and having escaped that religion forty-five years ago. I have no reason to defend either Islam or Muslims, and unlike the nice Muslim Israelis who say how committed they are to Israel, I will not mislead anyone, least of all Israelis, as to the true nature of Islam. I might even venture that I know a little more about the Palestinian mind than most Israelis do.
The closest Dr Finkel comes to the nature of Israel’s enemy is in general phrases such as, “as the enemy attempts to reconquer the territory”, "an enemy population prepared to conduct guerrilla warfare", "The transition of enemy behavior", "Losing territory is a painful loss for Israel’s enemies" and the like, which is not very close, as such expressions apply to almost any enemy. And this is the point. It would be going too far to describe Dr Finkel's approach as theoretical, but it is not practical in that it ignores what is specific to the enemy Israel faces. The essay displays all the one-dimensionality of a technocratic report, as comes across in the following staggering confession:
Israel has a great deal of experience in Lebanon. During Operation Hiram in October 1948, the IDF captured 14 villages in the eastern sector. Israel withdrew half a year later as part of an agreement with the Lebanese government, but in Operation Litani in 1978, the villages were recaptured. In the First Lebanon War in 1982, they were captured a third time; in the Second Lebanon War in 2006, they were captured a fourth time. If we were to capture them a fifth time, as well as other areas along the border for a fourth time, we will need to ensure as much as possible that that will be the last time they pose a threat to the border settlements.
To address this, the Brigadier General, in a 56-word closing paragraph, proposes as follows:
The way to do this [ensure as much as possible that that will be the last time they pose a threat to the border settlements], given the history I have described, is to gain internal and international legitimacy by turning these rural areas into a security zone under Israeli control. They should remain under Israeli security control until an agreement is reached that ensures that if Israel withdraws, the areas will no longer pose a threat. (My emphasis)
In the very history that Dr Finkel describes, he informs us that the first Israeli occupation of the Lebanese villages ended when “Israel withdrew half a year later as part of an agreement with the Lebanese government.” If that agreement did not ensure that “if Israel withdraws, the areas will no longer pose a threat,” then why did the next agreement not ensure it, or the agreement after that, or the one… Dr Finkel appears uninterested in what it is about these agreements that cause them to fail one after the other, but expects us to share his confidence that, firstly, such an agreement is possible, and secondly, that security will be achieved with the next agreement. Having failed to identify the key to a string of agreement failures, he also fails to identify in which way the next agreement will be different and how that difference will finally bring success. But the reasonable conclusion to draw is that Dr Finkel sees the securing of Israel’s border communities to lie in the agreement reached between Israel and her enemies, all Muslims.
The Western myth that wars are fought to strengthen one's hand at the negotiating table persists, despite this being but a professional "international relations" expert idealisation predicated on the assumption that everyone wants peace. The reality is that belligerents only resort to negotiations when one side cannot achieve complete victory over the other. But more to the point, some societies and cultures consider themselves permanently at war. When not shedding their enemies' blood, they are preparing to shed their enemies' blood. Such peoples and cultures understand the world only in terms of domination and submission. To fail to annex their territory in war is to ask for perpetual war.
Russians, Chinese and Muslims are such peoples and cultures. None of them is remotely interested in "getting to the negotiating table", another a quaint Western concept that makes no sense to them, that they have only the deepest contempt for, and that they will exploit in order to continue or resume the war. They are permanently at war and their societies are permanently geared up for war, even when they lack the means to physically engage in it. The very definition of Muslim includes being permanently at war with infidels, hence the prohibition on having Christian or Jewish friends. Such would be treason: "To be friends with them is to be one of them." Whenever Israelis trumpet that they don't want war, it is a juicy invitation to Muslims, especially Palestinians, to give them exactly that, because it announces that Israelis are not ready for war and will only fight reluctantly. Muslims always find an opportunity to find an opportunity.
Instead of forever talking about wanting peace, Israelis are far more likely to achieve peace by showing off their weapons, publicising their readiness for war, and talking openly about how much territory they could take in this or that scenario, and its effect on the enemy population. There is no Nazism and no Kokka-Shinto today because these were fought to complete and utter defeat by the most extreme means available. No one was idiotic enough to think that only the army was at war, not the population.
Thank God there was no negotiated settlement between belligerents to end WWII, for we would by now already have had WWIII, yet a negotiated settlement is exactly what today's Western powers want to impose on Israel and Ukraine, both facing enemies permanently at war. We even have the insanity of Western journalists demanding "proportionality" from Israel, without ever considering that to one side in that fight, proportionality is as meaningless as negotiation. The only way the Islamic Republic of Iran can attain world (not regional) domination is with a nuclear arsenal, yet Western diplomats "continue to believe that diplomacy is the best way to bring Iran to the negotiating table." This is the Wonderland in which Brigadier General (ret.) Dr Meir Finkel dwells, although, granted, not quite as deeply as General Aviv Kochavi.
Picture credits (Parts 1-3):
Mr. Edward J. Krasnoborski and Mr. Frank Martini, Department of History, U.S. Military AcademyHonza.havlicek (talk) - Israel 1949-1967.svg1948 arab israeli war - May15-June10.jpg, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=8507106
[1], Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=1631737
US Govt - Truman Library, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=70571571
Zvikorn - Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=85363862
Unknown author - Downtown Express, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=7505851
Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=114734
Government Press Office (Israel), CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=22807331
David Rubinger - This is available from National Photo Collection of Israel, Photography dept. Goverment Press Office (link), under the digital ID D327-047.This tag does not indicate the copyright status of the attached work. A normal copyright tag is still required. See Commons:Licensing for more information., Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=90236003
Ilan Bruner (אילן ברונר) - This is available from National Photo Collection of Israel, Photography dept. Goverment Press Office (link), under the digital ID D327-039.This tag does not indicate the copyright status of the attached work. A normal copyright tag is still required. See Commons:Licensing for more information., CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=34360333
Six_Day_War_Terrritories.png: User:Ling.Nutderivative work: Supreme Deliciousness (talk) - Six_Day_War_Terrritories.png, CC BY-SA 2.5, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=12031202
ChrisO - http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/israel.pdf (heavily modified), Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=1851514
Matthews, Matt - http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/matthewsOP26.pdf, Public Domain, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?curid=18410304
Shifra Levyathan, CC BY 2.5, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=7571352
Comments:
On 25 February at 14:26, Ben Dor A. wrote:
Dear Anjuli Pandavar
Exceptional. I will share it.
Have you sent a copy to Dr. Meir Finkel?
Best Regards
Ben Dor A.