International Humanitarian Law: Is it worth the paper it's written on?

Editorial note: In response to The paradox of Zionism that perplexes a wannabe Jew, Avinoam Ben Dor, a regular reader, commented with a lengthy question. My answer was similarly lengthy. It seemed appropriate to offer readers the whole exchange as an article in its own right.

On 13 May 2025 at 10:21, Ben Dor A. wrote:

Dear Anjuli Pandavar

I read your article with interest. I certainly agree with your concerns and checked this issue on the Internet as to our obligations as a state under attack:

This is the information gathered:

Israel's Right to Self-Defense Under International Law:
When a terrorist organization such as Hamas, Hezbollah, or the Houthis attacks Israel, international law recognizes Israel's inherent right to self-defense. This right is enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter, which states:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations...

Several key aspects of this right are relevant in the context of attacks by non-state actors like terrorist organizations:

Armed Attack:
While Article 51 explicitly refers to an "armed attack" by a member state, state practice and evolving interpretations of international law acknowledge that a large-scale attack by a non-state actor can also trigger the right to self-defense. The scale and effects of the attack, such as the number of casualties and the extent of damage, are important factors in determining whether it qualifies as an "armed attack."

The UN Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373, passed after the September 11th attacks, recognized the inherent right of self-defense in response to terrorist acts.

Necessity and Proportionality:
Any defensive action taken by Israel must adhere to the principles of necessity and proportionality under customary international law.

Necessity means that the use of force must be necessary to repel the attack and that there are no other peaceful means available to achieve the same objective.

Proportionality means that the defensive measures taken must be proportionate to the armed attack and must not be excessive. The response should be aimed at ending the attack and neutralizing the threat, not at retribution.

Attribution:
Traditionally, self-defense against non-state actors was often linked to the state hosting the organization, requiring evidence that the host state was either unable or unwilling to prevent the attacks. However, there is a growing acceptance that a state may act in self-defense against a terrorist organization operating from another state's territory even if the host state is not directly involved, particularly if the terrorist organization poses a significant and ongoing threat. The focus in such cases is on the necessity of the action to protect the state's population.

Imminence:
While Article 51 refers to an attack that "occurs," the concept of anticipatory self-defense is debated. Some argue that a state may take action if an attack is imminent and unavoidable. However, this remains a contentious area of international law with strict conditions of necessity and imminence.

In the context of Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis:
Israel has consistently maintained its right to defend itself against attacks emanating from territories controlled by these organizations.

Military operations conducted by Israel in response to attacks have often been justified under the right to self-defense.

The legality of specific actions taken by Israel is often scrutinized under the principles of necessity and proportionality.

Israel's Obligation to Supply Humanitarian Aid to Aggressors:
International humanitarian law (IHL) governs the conduct of armed conflict and aims to protect civilians and limit suffering. It distinguishes between the obligations of a state engaged in conflict and its obligations towards the civilian population.

Regarding the obligation to supply humanitarian aid:

General Principle: IHL places obligations on parties to a conflict to allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need.² This is enshrined in the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and Additional Protocol I.

Occupying Power:
The obligations of an occupying power towards the population in the occupied territory are more extensive under IHL. However, Israel's status as an occupying power in Gaza and parts of the West Bank is a subject of ongoing debate. Israel withdrew its permanent military presence from Gaza in 2005.

Aid to the Civilian Population:
Even if Israel is not considered an occupying power in all the areas from which attacks originate, it still has obligations under IHL to allow humanitarian aid to reach the civilian population in those areas, especially if that population is in dire need due to the conflict. This obligation is linked to the prohibition of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare.

No Obligation to Directly Aid Aggressors:
IHL does not obligate a state to directly supply humanitarian aid to the armed groups or terrorist organizations that are attacking it. The focus of humanitarian aid is on the civilian population.

Preventing Diversion:
Israel has a legitimate concern to ensure that humanitarian aid intended for civilians is not diverted to or used by the terrorist organizations that are the aggressors. Measures to inspect and control the distribution of aid are often taken for this reason. However, these measures should not unduly impede the timely delivery of essential aid to civilians.

Recent Developments:
The issue of humanitarian aid to Gaza has been a subject of intense legal and political debate, particularly in light of the ongoing conflict with Hamas. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has also been considering Israel's obligations regarding the provision of humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian population.

In summary:
Israel has a right under international law to defend its population against attacks by terrorist organizations like Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, adhering to the principles of necessity and proportionality. While Israel is not obligated to directly supply humanitarian aid to these aggressor organizations, it does have obligations under international humanitarian law to allow and facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid to the civilian populations in the areas they control, who may be in need due to the conflict, while taking reasonable measures to prevent aid diversion to the aggressors. The specifics of these obligations can be complex and are subject to ongoing legal and political discourse.

There are people in Israel who are torn between these dilemmas.

What are your thoughts on the issue?

Best Regards
Ben Dor A.

On 13 May 2025 at 10:50, Anjuli Pandavar wrote:

Thank you Ben Dor A. for such a comprehensive comment. I appreciate it.

Let me say at the outset that I am not a specialist in International Humanitarian Law. This does not, however, preclude me from bringing my critical faculties to bear on any issue, including this one, whether I am a specialist in it or not, while recognising, of course, that there are details, principles and subtleties that I might not appreciate the depths or implications of, or indeed, might not be aware of at all. This is not to be confused, God forbid, with the postmodern notion that every opinion is as valid as every other, regardless of its grounding, or lack thereof, in reality. I claim no right to be listened to and am always grateful to be corrected. As with anything else, I approach this issue with intellectual honesty and, I hope, moral courage, and could not care less for those who might take offence to what I have to say or how I say it.

Your comment offers a useful overview. I have a problem with the concept of "non-state actors," but that is perhaps a topic for another day.

What I find most relevant to Israel's situation, however, is not covered in your overview. Particularly striking is your presumption that International Humanitarian Law (IHL) exists for and is applied to accomplish justice and fairness. This is manifestly not the case, as the application of International Law to Israel, for decades, but particularly brazenly after October 7, abundantly illustrates. More relevant in Israel's situation than the detailed stipulations of IHL, is the integrity of IHL itself, for law without integrity is not law, but abuse. If IHL lacks integrity, then it lends itself to unfair application, i.e., to the detriment of some and the benefit of others. Can it then not be advanced that those who insist on strict adherence to its imperfect stipulations regardless of context might harbour malicious intent?

I don't think there is any need here to catalogue the very long travesty that is the witch-hunt against Israel in multiple domains of International Law. It is structurally impossible for International Law to be fairly applied to Israel, because:

1. Two of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, Russia and China, hold to ethics incompatible with the rule of law and enjoy veto power over UNSC resolutions. They always abuse International Law, because such law is not a higher principle to them. Indeed, it is a foolish contrivance that simply adds another weapon to their geopolitical arsenal. By this fact alone, one, there can never be a resolution legally sound enough to compel their ascent; and two, in effect, UNSC resolutions do not apply to them. Consider, for example, that as early as 8 October 2023, Russia moved to expunge the events of the day before from all future considerations pertaining to what was about to unfold in Israel and Gaza.
2. The remaining three members of the UNSC, the United States, the United Kingdom and France, may profess adherence to the rule of law, but they are as fickle as their electoral politics and as cynical as their Deep States. While they may not always abuse International Law, they cannot be relied on to never do so, and it would be prudent to assume that they abuse it all the time. They are also adept at taking a principled stance in one international forum, while their actions elsewhere cancel out any effect that principled stance might have. Consider, for example, the US's "ironclad" support for Israel, while already on 8 October beginning to lay the foundations for what later developed into the narrative of "famine" in Gaza.
3. The non-permanent members of the UNSC and the UN General Assembly are dominated by member states that, like the UNSC permanent members Russia and China, do not care for the rule of law and, like them, treat it as a joke. To them, those who take International Law seriously are fools who, as such, deserve to be abused. Consider, for example, China's joining the Human Rights Council:
   
   "China wants to turn the HRC into something else entirely: a shell, emptied of universal values, substantive rights, and independent human rights monitoring mechanisms — a body in which individuals and civil society organizations seeking to hold governments to account for human rights violations have no place and no voice." (Sinopsis)
   
   Much more seriously, especially for Israel, is the founding of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, today the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), in 1969. This event boosted the global jihad reach of the Muslim Brotherhood, the World Muslim League and the Arab League to a hitherto unattainable extent. Unlike Russia and China, the IOC's members not only do not care for International Law, they are actively using the United Nations to destroy International Law, starting with supplanting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) with the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam (CDHRI), now an official UN document. The CDHRI does nothing less than lay the foundations for imposing Shari'a across the world, starting with the "Islamophobia" mania. Since then, both polygamy and paedophilia have become part of Western norms. All those black Americans so keen on Islam might want to think about Article 11 of the CDHRI. It's the slavery clause.
   
   How seriously should Israel take a Migration Compact clearly designed to facilitate and expedite a jihad takeover of the West? How seriously should Israel take an International Criminal Court that appears unaware of its own jurisdiction, and is headed by a fierce anti-Semite on a personal vendetta against Israel? How seriously should Israel take UN Women, an organisation that for months could not even bring itself to mention the rapes of Israeli women that Palestinians had perpetrated on October 7, and is headed by a darling of Iran? How seriously should Israel take an International Court of Justice where plaintiffs brazenly conspire to redefine genocide so they can "get Israel" for committing it? Why pine for acceptance in such disreputable places?
4. International Humanitarian Law assumes a clear, legally-defensible definition of "civilian" in contradistinction to "combatant", the latter being identifiable by military uniforms and insignia (Russia's "little green men" wore no insignia on their uniforms when they invaded Crimea). It also assumes that "civilians" and "combatants" are spatially segregated. There can be very few in the world unaware that jihad terrorists both hide behind and blend into civilian populations. Similarly, only the wilfully ignorant will be unaware of the significant "civilian" support for and participation in the total war effort of "terrorist organizations like Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis." Consider how many Israeli captives released from Hamas captivity attest to having been held in "civilian" homes. Consider how many times the IDF could not bomb a target because "civilians" refused to vacate the target. In jihad, "civilians" and "combatants" form an organic continuum. One can only insist on treating "civilians" differently to "combatants" if one denies that the war against Israel is jihad. Dealing with that denial is a whole other problem.
5. Finally, the rule of law (itself far from perfect) entails both restrictions and protections, and here Israel is the architect of her own misfortune. There are two aspects to this. Firstly, the international demands for compliance with the rules of war are made of Israel, but not of her enemies. Hamas and their brother organisations are free to operate as if no rules of war exist (the ICC even mocks Israel by issuing arrest warrants for dead Hamas military leaders). I do not have to belabour the absurdity of one side forced to fight by the rules and the other not, yet Israel complies, instead of telling the "International community" to go jump. If Israel still insist on fighting by the rules of war under these condition, then she has exchanged her protections under the law for Hamas's restrictions, thus ending up doubly-restricted while Hamas enjoys double-protection. But it is worse.
   
   Secondly, Israel does not even fight according to the rules of war; she fights according to the rules of peace! According to the rules of war, if civilians are present at a military target (incidentally, everything in Gaza is a military target) and harming them is unavoidable, the target remains a valid military target. The fact that Israel does not attack targets where "civilians" are present is a triple-problem of her own making: one, she provides safe areas for the enemy and herself protects those areas ("Why do you store your weapons in hospitals?" asked the interrogator. "Because the Jews never attack hospitals." Duh-uh!); two, Israel's soldiers become sitting ducks; and, three, the enemy gets away.
   
   There is no question that a civilian to combatant fatality ratio of 1:1 in urban warfare is an astonishing accomplishment. The Prime Minister is very proud of this and repeats it endlessly, each time more frustrated than before that none of Israel's innumerable enemies will acknowledge what an exceptionally moral army the IDF is. However, exercising such restraint and taking such risks are not stipulations in International Law, but are what Israel imposes upon herself quite unnecessarily since it serves no legal purpose, and then expects her enemies and their many supporters, people who want Israel gone and all Jews dead, to be impressed with what good people the Jews are. Over these more than eighteen months, anti-semitism has not only not decreased, it has increased. So what was the point of holding back? What was the point of not fighting a real war that could have been over already by January 2024, according to the soldiers?
6. No law is perfect, and International Humanitarian Law is no exception. International Humanitarian Law fails to clearly differentiate between "civilians" and "combatants," a blurring that, in fact, perfectly matches conditions in Gaza. It is exactly this legal imperfection that Israel squandered by wanting to show Jews to be "better than Hamas", obviously an extremely difficult thing to do. For this vanity, soldiers died. To my way of thinking, because International Law allows you to bomb "civilian" facilities that are used for military purposes regardless of the presence of civilians (provided only that they are not expressly targeted) and Hamas taking advantage of this by using hospitals, schools, mosques and children's bedrooms as military facilities, Israel had the perfect legal cover to destroy every single hospital, school, mosque and children's bedroom on Day One, which would immediately have put much of Hamas out of action.
   
   By this same logic, because the distinction between civilians and combatants is blurred in law, so, by that very fact, must the distinction between feeding civilians and not feeding combatants be blurred. In short, if she wanted to, Israel could, perfectly legally, starve everyone on the grounds that they are all, to a greater or lesser degree, combatants. Between the extreme of blanket starvation and the extreme of getting your own soldiers killed just to impress an uninterested world with how good you are, it should not be to hard to find a formula that gets Israel something for going to the trouble of feeding her killers at all, without kowtowing to so-called International Humanitarian Law.

That's the best I can do.

Best regards,
Anjuli

Picture credits:

Comments:

On 13 May 2025 at 21:48, Ben Dor A. wrote:

Dear Anjuli Pandavar

Thank you for your thorough and detailed reply. It appears that my questions inspired you to highlight other concerns regarding Israel's conduct in the Gaza war that you find unusual.

It seems that both you and I are not alone in being bothered by Israel's peculiar actions in its war against Hamas in Gaza. Below is a link to another site which also published an article today addressing these very issues:

"International law:

Article 23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention explicitly allows a state to withhold humanitarian aid from an enemy combatant under certain conditions.
To wit:

The obligation of a High Contracting Party to allow the free passage of the consignments [humanitarian aid] indicated in the preceding paragraph is subject to the condition that this Party is satisfied that there are no serious reasons for fearing:

(a) that the consignments may be diverted from their destination,

(b) that the control may not be effective, or

(c) that a definite advantage may accrue to the military efforts or economy of the enemy through the substitution of the above-mentioned consignments for goods which would otherwise be provided or produced by the enemy or through the release of such material, services or facilities as would otherwise be required for the production of such goods."

https://jihadwatch.org/2025/05/359834

Best Regards
Ben Dor A.

On 14 May 2025 at 7:00, Ben Dor A. wrote

Dear Anjuli Pandavar

I did further inquire on the issue of use of human shields and these were the remarks:

You've hit upon a central and intensely debated issue in contemporary international law and security. The challenges posed by non-state actors like terrorist organizations, who systematically disregard the laws of war while operating within civilian populations, do indeed strain the traditional framework of international law, which was primarily designed to regulate the behavior of states.

There's a significant discussion within legal, academic, and policy circles about whether and how international law needs to adapt to address these realities. Arguments for amending, revising, or reinterpreting existing laws include:

Arguments for Adapting International Law:

Asymmetry of Conflict:
The current legal framework often places significant constraints on states while non-state actors operate with impunity, exploiting these constraints to their advantage. This creates an asymmetric battlefield where democratic states are perceived to be unduly hampered in defending themselves.

The "Human Shield" Problem:
The deliberate use of civilian populations as human shields by terrorist organizations creates a legal and ethical quagmire. Current laws struggle to adequately address the responsibility of the shielding party and the permissible actions of the state under attack.

Defining "Armed Attack" by Non-State Actors:
The threshold for what constitutes an "armed attack" by a non-state actor that triggers the right to self-defense is still debated. The scale and nature of attacks by groups like Hamas have pushed these boundaries.

State Responsibility and Non-State Actors:
The traditional focus on state responsibility makes it difficult to hold non-state actors accountable directly under international law.

The Evolving Nature of Conflict:
Modern conflicts increasingly involve non-state actors, cyber warfare, and other challenges that were not fully anticipated when the core tenets of international law were established.

Challenges and Considerations in Amending International Law:

State Sovereignty:
Any significant changes to international law would require broad consensus among states, which is often difficult to achieve due to differing national interests and political ideologies. Concerns about infringing on state sovereignty are a major hurdle.

Protecting Human Rights:
Any revisions must be carefully considered to ensure they do not erode fundamental human rights and protections for civilians. There's a risk that attempts to address the challenges posed by terrorism could lead to overly broad or authoritarian interpretations of the law.

Defining Terrorism:
Reaching a universally agreed-upon definition of terrorism remains a significant challenge, which would be crucial for any legal reforms targeting terrorist organizations.

Enforcement:
Even with revised laws, the challenge of enforcement against non-state actors operating outside the control of states would persist.

Current Trends and Interpretations:
While wholesale rewriting of international law is unlikely in the near future, there are ongoing trends in interpretation and state practice that attempt to address these challenges:

Expanding the Scope of Self-Defense:
Some interpretations argue for a more flexible approach to the right of self-defense against non-state actors, particularly when the host state is unable or unwilling to prevent attacks.

Focus on the Actions of Terrorist Organizations:
There's a growing emphasis on holding terrorist organizations accountable for their violations of IHL, even if they are not states.

Developing Norms Against Human Shielding:
Efforts are underway to strengthen the condemnation and legal consequences for the use of human shields.

Refining Proportionality Assessments:
Legal scholars and military practitioners are constantly grappling with how to apply the principle of proportionality in asymmetric conflicts.

In conclusion, your observation is valid and reflects a significant debate in international law. While a complete overhaul of the legal framework is improbable, there's a clear need for ongoing discussion, interpretation, and potentially incremental adjustments to better address the challenges posed by terrorist organizations in the 21st century. The goal is to ensure that democratic states have the means to defend themselves effectively while upholding the fundamental principles of humanity and the rule of law.


Best Regards
Ben Dor A.

On 14 May 2025 at 12:07, Anjuli Pandavar wrote:

Hi Avinoam,

Thank you for continuing this important discussion.

I see several presumptions underlying the exposition you offer:

The paramountcy of states
It is an axiom in the international relation paradigm that everything issues from and revolves around the nation-state as the world's primary organising principle. This Enlightenment prejudice takes it for granted that other organising principles, especially religion and ideology, but also capital, are not, and if they once were, they have since been transcended and so are irrelevant. An effect of this prejudice is to dismiss without a further thought that states themselves might act according to the interests of an overarching religion and hold themselves answerable to an overarching body representing that religion. Objections range from, yes, yes, we've had the Roman Catholic Church, but the Pope no longer wields power over states, to, "That's just dumb!" (the professional opinion of one International Relations expert). A crippling outcome of this prejudice is the Western inability to even conceptualise, let alone handle, an organisation such as the Muslim Brotherhood, a "non-state actor" that happens to be the fountainhead of most terrorist organisations, all also "non-state actors".

The awkward category of "non-state actors"
The very term non-state actors is an admission of being at a loss for how to conceptualise them, in short, "we don't know what we're talking about". To categorise something as a "non-" anything is a negative statement, like saying the earth is a non-star (and is similarly non-illuminating). The presumption here is that the only thing worth understanding is states, with the ontological implication that if it is not a state, or subject to a state, then it does not exist, and it is irrational to even contemplate it. Of course, that they do exist is inescapable, because they act. They fly passenger jets into skyscrapers and even invade states, yet are all smothered under the bland "non-state actors", and relegated to the footnotes in the dominant orthodoxy. These two presumptions, the paramountcy of states and "irrational existence" of so-called "non-state actors", when applied to the Middle East, North Africa and Asia, lead to catastrophic outcomes, such as never-ending wars, but the fault is never the paradigm, and always the dumb people who think there are such things as religious and ideological wars. Consider the implications of this:

The current legal framework often places significant constraints on states while non-state actors operate with impunity, exploiting these constraints to their advantage. This creates an asymmetric battlefield...

Let us first dispense with the ahistorical "asymmetric battlefield". Has the driving force of the history of warfare not been the constant strive for asymmetric battlefields? All innovation in warfare stems from this. Today we call it an arms race, set off when one ape hurled a rock to overpower another. The presumption here is that the default state of the world is peace, something that is presumed (and rightfully desired), but far from proven. The most that can be said with certainty at this point is that peace is the absence of war.

A prejudice arising out of the presumption of peace as the default condition is that the conduct of war must have the imperatives of peace imposed upon it. So the battlefield must be "symmetrical," like a fair contract, and all sides must play by the rules. That this does not happen is automatically ascribed to those who "do not play by the rules", rather than to those who took it upon themselves to impose the rules of peace onto war in the first place, and then took it for granted that everyone in the war will conduct themselves as if they are at peace. Knowing that an adversary will comply with these rules is in itself an invitation to attack. The most effective deterrent to war has been not knowing what an adversary will do or what he is capable of doing, something that both Russia and China (both states, by the way), use to great effect, while riding roughshod over the "rules-based order".

So how can the "problem" of "significant constraints on states while non-state actors operate with impunity," be solved? Since a symmetric battlefields is the aim, the options are: one, impose the same constraints on non-state actors as are imposed on states and enforce them—rather tricky, since non-state actors are held to be fundamentally irrational, and to treat them the same as states is to recognise them as of the same order as states, which means reducing states to the same order as non-state actors; or, two, free states from all constraints on war-fighting, which of course, will never be done. This means that the paradigm is the problem. In common parlance, that's messed-up thinking.

The presumed universality of human rights
The concept of human rights is much more than just a historical accomplishment. It is epochal in that it announces the emergence of a hitherto only marginally-known human being, the autonomous individual. But as such, it is particular to societies in which the individual has become the fundamental social unit. The rights the individual may enjoy, the protections he or she may rely on and the constraints they must accept are all enshrined in laws regulating the interactions between individuals and between individuals and the state.

But in most of the current states of the world, the individual is not the fundamental unit of society. In these states, the family or the clan or the tribe is the fundamental social unit. In such states, human rights have meaning only to the extent that the individual has meaning. Anything concerning the individual concerns the entire family, clan or tribe, that holds organic “power of attorney,” to use a relatable term, over the individual. To expect of such societies to uphold human rights, such as the Enlightenment bequeathed and we cherish, is to expect then to dissolve themselves. Islamic society is one of the societies whose social structure is antithetical to human rights. The Middle East is an ocean of Islamic societies. War or no war, states or non-state actors, no one in the Islamic world, or in most of Asia, is going to care about human rights. Within this context, what are we to make of the following:

Any revisions must be carefully considered to ensure they do not erode fundamental human rights and protections for civilians. There's a risk that attempts to address the challenges posed by terrorism could lead to overly broad or authoritarian interpretations of the law.

The presumption of a human shield problem
In societies that function with few or marginalised autonomous individuals, the absence of human rights is not an imposition; it is what keeps that society ticking over, whatever we may think of the terrible human cost associated with such arrangements. Since no one conceives of themselves as individuals, but rather as assets at the disposal of the family, clan or tribe, their own physical survival is secondary to the survival of the fundamental unit they are part of. Think of a Palestinian mother’s distress when her child has died without killing a Jew to bring honour to her family. In light of this, consider what underlies the following:

The deliberate use of civilian populations as human shields by terrorist organizations creates a legal and ethical quagmire. Current laws struggle to adequately address the responsibility of the shielding party and the permissible actions of the state under attack.

It is here assumed, firstly, that the “civilian population” and the “terrorist organisation” are two different things. They are both part of the same society, subscribing to the same ideological underpinnings. In the case of jihad, the "civilians" who serve as human shield freely play their part in protecting the killers, for which they will be rewarded in Heaven. Secondly, that the use of a human shield is a conscious act on the part of the terrorists to do something wrong. Protecting “those who give their blood” is a recognised act of worship in Islam. Thirdly, that the “civilian populations” is forced into the role of human shields. It is impossible for the Western mind to comprehend that the “civilian population” is eager to die this way. The “legal and ethical quagmire” exists only on the side of those who impose these laws. In any case, human shields, whether voluntary or forced, are still “civilians” present at a military target. How much more so in the case of jihad? The target is legal and this is war, not peace. There is nothing to agonise over.

With best regards,
Anjuli

On 14 May 2025 at 15:06, Ben Dor A. wrote:

Dear Anjuli Pandavar

Thank you for your response today to my emails.

Reading your intelligent reply to all my queries, I'm beginning to contemplate that you are capable of contributing your talents to improve the present contemporary International laws and Rules of Engagement. (RoE).

Your ability to process and understand these complex issues enables your valuable contribution to these fields.

BTW, I shared your articles and our exchange of information with a friend who is an expert in the field of genocide and he replied that these issues are just too complicated for him. 😊

Best Regards
Ben Dor A.